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I. THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: A CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY?
The concept of UN global governance is premised on the assumption that the community of states is evolving towards an international constitutional order, centred on the norms enshrined in the UN Charter and on the UN institutional structure. 7 The UN Charter may be prima facie construed as a constitution of the world community, insofar as its main principles and purposes (including the prohibition on the threat or use of force, the obligation concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes, co-operation and friendly relations amongst states and the promotion and protection of human rights) provide the framework of all international rules, and every other treaty regime must be consistent therewith.
The ILC conclusions on the fragmentation of international law explicitly underscore the universally accepted 'specialty' of UN Charter norms. 8 See ILC Conclusions on Fragmentation (n 1) [36] : 'It is also recognized that the United Nations Charter enjoys special character owing to the fundamental nature of some of its norms, particularly its principles and purposes and its universal acceptance'. 9 See UN Charter Article 52: 'Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes It is important to appreciate at the same time that, given the quasi-universal UN membership, the relationship with existing custom presents a theoretical rather than a practical interest. In the event that a norm based on the Charter were to conflict with a customary norm, the Charter-based norm would take precedence as lex specialis between the parties. It may be argued, however, that the formation of a new customary norm could prevail over from the Charter as lex posterior or 'subsequent practice' in relation to the Charter (for instance, should generalized practice and opinio juris arise in connection with humanitarian intervention, this may legitimize an exception from the prohibition of force in derogation of the Charter).
prevail'.
Article 103 has thus been apparently incorporated into general treaty law. ILC describes the self-contained regime as a 'group of rules and principles concerned with a particular subject matter' and 'applicable as lex speciali'.
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The EU is arguably one of the most advanced forms of subsystem: it is an institutionalized self-contained regime, based on both primary rules and rules of responsibility established by the founding treaty rather than by international law, having its own institutions to administer the relevant rules and monitored by specific tribunals or quasi-judicial bodies. Naturally, no regime is completely self-contained insofar as it depends on general rules to operate (law of treaties etc.), and where there is no special regulation of a matter, general law still plays a residual role. 41 Also, the EU is still subject to the rules of international law in relation to third parties (e.g. in connection with responsibility for breach of UN law vis-à-vis non-EU States). For the ECJ, the norms relating to the protection of human rights or regulating the checks and balances within the EU cannot be displaced.
Arguably, the European subsystem has reached a level of integration such that it has generated its own jus cogens. regulation were not disclosed to the court, no review of its lawfulness was possible, which amounted to a violation of 'the fundamental right to an effective legal remedy'. 56 The CFI therefore concluded that the Council adopted the regulation in breach of Mr Othman's fundamental rights, in particular rights of the defence, the right to effective judicial review and the right to property. On the other hand, the ECJ itself has maintained the approach taken in Kadi.
The recent judgment in the joint appeal cases of Ayadi and Hassan issued on 3 56 Ibid [88] . 57 The Court recalled that a decision declaring a regulation to be void takes effect only from the date of expiry of the period in which an appeal may be brought before the CFI, two months and ten days from notification of the judgment (or, if an appeal has been brought within that period, as from the date of dismissal of the appeal); the CFI thus considered that the The Office of the Ombudsperson will completely replace the Focal point for delisting, whose activity will be limited to receiving delisting requests in connection with other sanctions lists. 78 The establishment of an independent body for the review of delisting petitions, as requested by the critics of the informed of the decision, and in turn informs the petitioner; when applicable, he or she removes the name from the list.
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The only substantial improvement introduced by the procedure is that it apparently guarantees the review of the case, regardless of the initiative of a State in the Committee. Other positive developments are enhanced transparency, because of the better coordination of the information exchange between the petitioner, the Committee and any other relevant parties, and the quasi-interlocutory phase (the applicant has an opportunity to respond, indirectly, to the questions addressed by any member of the Committee). That said, the new procedure does not notable alter the decision-making mechanism:
the delisting decision is made by the same political body according to the same rules. The Ombudsperson's report is not in the form of a decision on the case, as it merely summarizes arguments and evidence, and whatever his or her findings, the report is in no way binding. Also, the presence of the 87 testifies the Security Council's awareness that noncompliance by major international players will lead to a decrease in UN authority.
V. CONCLUSIONS: EU AND UN, CONFLICT RATHER THAN COLLABORATION?
The reality of self-contained regimes is not novel. The ECJ had long established in historical judgments that the EC Treaty is 'more than an international agreement' and has created 'a new legal order', 88 'its own legal system', 89 What is most striking in Kadi and in the subsequent developments in EU legislation is that, while initially designed to accommodate UN obligations, this special regime places itself in conflict rather than continuity with UN law.
Article 307 of the EC Treaty was introduced to safeguard the precedence of UN obligations. 91 Also, Article 10 A of the Lisbon Treaty explicitly confirms that the EU is expected to function in agreement with the UN Charter:
1. The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement:…democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for and/ or to CFI rulings on the merits will weaken the authority of UN decisions and, possibly, the collaborative relationship between the UN and other treaty- 92 The court acknowledges that, on the international plane, UN obligations are hierarchically superior, but states that within the EU fundamental EU principles take precedence. This implies that international obligations will not be given effect unless consistent with EU obligations, which reduces the recognition of UN primacy to a 'theoretical concession'. See Draghici (n 4) 657.
based regimes. 
